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Private spaces, online and offline, are valuable. 
Privacy allows people to exercise control and grants 
freedom. A private space may be necessary to 
develop one’s own plans, to forge relationships, 
and to understand the world. Different political and 
social contexts will affect people’s conceptions of 
privacy, and the circumstances in which it is most 
valued. But the key concern remains, that private 
spaces are necessary for freedom and security. 
Which online spaces are considered private 
by policymakers and platforms has significant 
ramifications, from defining technical specifications 
for online spaces to enforcing regulation of platform 
action on harmful content online. At the heart of 
this debate is a tension between different security 
needs: between the need to tackle serious harms 
that can proliferate in private online spaces, and the 
need to preserve the ability of individuals to protect 
themselves and communicate safely in private. 
Within current policy and platform discussions, 
the concepts of public and private spaces are 
frequently employed, but with admitted uncertainty 
about their practical application. This lack of clarity 
on what a private space online is or should be risks 
a fragmented implementation of different visions 
of privacy, and the use of different standards and 
different definitions. This will come at a significant 
cost to transparency, coherence and predictability 
of how online spaces operate: affecting internet 
users, businesses and security.
This paper examines the spectrum of online spaces 
and our expectations around our private and public 
lives online, in order to present a definition of a 
private space online. We draw on philosophical 
literature, offline analogies to public spaces, as 
well as legal frameworks and cases. In addition, 
we build upon the results of an original nationally 
representative poll, carried out by Demos in May 
2020, of 1,035 people in the UK.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
We present our working definition of a private 
space online: 
An online space should be considered private 
insofar as a user can reasonably expect that  
they control who sees information that they  
share within that space.
It is not the case that the only spaces which we 
should think of as private are those in which a user 
in fact has total control of their information. Rather, 
if a user reasonably expects to have that control, 
then the information within that space should 
be treated as private and that information not 
accessed or used without their knowledge, except 
in exceptional circumstances.
We believe that this definition is valuable as, 
although what is a ‘reasonable expectation’ is 
clearly contestable, it centres users’ experiences 
and understanding, and at a minimum confers 
obligations on companies to be transparent and 
upfront about who can see information that users 
share (not simply hide the fact away in terms and 
conditions or legal jargon). Otherwise users may 
reasonably expect that their information is private, 
from platforms as well as from other users. 
This definition also acknowledges that there 
are degrees of privacy. No space is 100% public 
or 100% private - different social and technical 
contexts, expectations of users, ownership of 
and access to the space, all intersect to establish 
the degree to which a space is or is not private. 
Definitions suggested by respondents to our polling 
for what makes a private space online suggests a 
spectrum along the following lines: 
• Most private - a personal, secure online space, 
which can be accessed and controlled only by 
one individual user. 
EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
• Semi-private - a space where only a limited 
number of known participants communicate, 
where trust and technical safeguards allow 
information shared to be controlled by users - 
perhaps with exceptions for legitimate authorities 
to access or transparent platform oversight. 
• Not at all private - a space where contents of 
communications can be viewed by anybody, and 
used or shared without having to go through any 
barriers - although social expectations and safety 
precautions may limit what people share in these 
spaces.
In practice, this definition leads to various 
obligations that platforms, policymakers, and other 
stakeholders should consider when designing, 
regulating, or accessing private spaces online. 
There is a need for users to be able to exert 
maximal control over their information if they 
choose. Users should have access to spaces 
which offer clear privacy - where they are able 
to understand and control who has access to 
information which they are sharing, and where 
data is end-to-end encrypted. This need not be 
the case for all messaging services, but where it is 
not the case, this should be clearly communicated 
to users and alternatives offered. End-to-end 
encryption as a tool for ensuring privacy should 
be protected. In our view, current proposals for 
exceptional access do not provide adequate 
technical protection for the rights of users against 
extrajudicial access by state or non-state actors. 
Therefore, alternative social and technical solutions 
to the problems of illegal content in end-to-end 
encrypted spaces should be invested in and built 
through collaboration and open discussion between 
government, tech platforms and civil society. 
In other spaces (e.g. private messages which 
are not encrypted) users may have a reasonable 
expectation that they control the information 
they share there, which should only be breached 
in exceptional circumstances. Platforms should 
provide data to law enforcement only in a targeted 
way, in response to an authorised request with 
clear judicial oversight. Platforms should also have 
a burden of proof to demonstrate, where they 
are accessing people’s messages for commercial 
use, that their users do not have a reasonable 
expectation that that information is private from 
the company. This would include, but not be 
limited to, clear terms of service. Companies which 
met independent standards on doing so could 
be eligible for a ‘kitemark’ that indicated their 
appropriate management of private spaces online.
In spaces where users have reasonable 
expectations that others may access and use 
their information, platforms and other actors 
may do so. This expectation must be managed 
through transparency and access and use should 
be on the basis of meaningful consent. Platforms 
should ensure that information about the control 
and accessibility of spaces is sufficient for users to 
engage with and meaningfully consent to the terms 
offered. Researchers, when seeking to access data 
from private spaces online, should be transparent 
about their activities and intentions, and give users 
the option, where possible, to retain or consent to 
handing over control of their information.
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When considering the question, ‘Can I access the contents of  
another person’s communications?’, the answers may be:
Semi-private spaces Public spacesPrivate spaces
YES, WITH A WARRANT YES, WITH CONSENTNO
In other spaces, users may 
lack technical control, but have 
a reasonable expectation that 
they control the information 
they share there, which should 
only be breached in exceptional 
circumstances
In spaces where users have 
reasonable expectations that 
others may access and use their 
information, platforms and other 
actors may do so. This access and 
use must be fully transparent and 
consented to meaningfully.
There is a need for users to  
be able to exert maximal control 
over their information if  
they choose.
This can be summarised as a tripartite test for engaging with private spaces online. 
The ideas of privacy and private spaces online, and 
the emergence of enormous digital public spaces, 
represent perhaps the two most important digital 
policy debates in recent years. Rarely, however, are 
the two connected. On the one hand are questions 
around our right to a private life online that tend 
to flare up around surveillance, security and the 
microprofiling of each and every internet user by 
major platforms. Seemingly separate debates take 
place about the health and freedom of the new, 
digital communities that so many of us treat as the 
digital public square.
This paper brings these two debates together, 
examining the spectrum of online spaces and 
our expectations around our private and public 
lives online. In Part 1, we discuss why we need a 
definition of private spaces online. Which online 
spaces are considered private, and which ones 
might not, will shape the future of regulation in this 
space. In Part 2, we present our working definition 
of a private space online:
An online space should be considered private 
insofar as a user can reasonably expect that  
they control who sees information that they  
share within that space.
In approaching the question of how to define 
private spaces online, we present a consideration 
of offline analogies which we believe are useful in 
guiding this discussion. In Part 3, we set out some 
of the ramifications of our proposed definition for 
policy and practice, from how users can conceive of 
spaces, to how platforms should design spaces, to 
how policymakers should regulate them and how 
law enforcement should approach them.
Continuing our discussion from What’s in a name?, 
with its focus on anonymity online, we propose a 
tripartite test that can be used for examining private 
spaces online.
Can I access the contents of another person’s 
communications?
• NO: There is a need for users to be able to exert 
maximal control over their information if they 
choose. 
• YES, WITH A WARRANT: In other spaces, users 
may lack technical control but have a reasonable 
expectation that they control the information they 
share there, which should only be breached in 
exceptional circumstances. 
• YES, WITH CONSENT: In spaces where users 
have reasonable expectations that others may 
access and use their information, platforms 
and other actors may do so. This access and 
use must be fully transparent and consented to 
meaningfully.
In Part 4, we present recommendations for policy 
and practice. Throughout, we draw on philosophical 
literature, offline analogies to public spaces, legal 
frameworks and cases, and an original nationally 
representative poll of 1,035 people in the UK, 




PART 1  
TOWARDS A  
DEFINITION OF  
PRIVATE SPACE 
ONLINE
Which online spaces are considered private 
by policymakers and platforms has significant 
ramifications, from defining technical specifications 
for online spaces to enforcing regulation of  
platform action on harmful content online. 
At the heart of this debate is a tension. The recent 
history of the internet has shown that private 
online spaces, such as closed groups, chats or 
other private messaging services, are often those 
in which terrorist content or CSEA (child sexual 
exploitation and abuse) imagery is shared, violence 
is incited, and dangerous misinformation can be 
spread, without oversight or remedy.1,2, 3, 4 They are 
also places where journalists can speak to at-risk 
sources; where members of marginalised groups 
can come together to support each other and share 
their experiences safely; where civil society can plan 
and organise without fear of reprisal or persecution. 
Within current policy discussions, the concepts of 
public and private spaces are frequently employed, 
but with admitted uncertainty about their practical 
application. The UK Online Harms White Paper, 
published by the Department of Culture, Media  
and Sport in 2019, says that: 
‘Any requirements to scan or monitor 
content for tightly defined categories of 
illegal content will not apply to private 
channels. We are consulting on definitions of 
private communications, and what measures 
should apply to these services.’
Governments are not the only ones making moves 
here. Platforms are also signalling intentions 
to change where on the spectrum of public or 
private spaces they lie. Facebook, in setting out its 
1.   Paul, K. Facebook’s crackdown on dangerous content in groups could backfire, experts say. The Guardian, 2019. Available at  https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2019/aug/14/facebook-private-groups-rules-extremist-fake-news [accessed 30 July 2020]
2.   Porter, T. Unlicensed medical ‘cures’ are flourishing in closed Facebook groups, where cancer treatments — and even surgery — are sold beyond the reach of the 
law. Business Insider, 2019. Available at https://www.businessinsider.com/in-closed-facebook-groups-pushing-unproven-treatments-2019-8?r=US&IR=T [ 
accessed 30 July 2020]
3.   Pietsch, B. Mass shooting rumor in Facebook Group shows private chats are not risk-free. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-groups-focus/
mass-shooting-rumor-in-facebook-group-shows-private-chats-are-not-risk-free-idUSKBN1WP1CG [accessed 30 July 2020]
4.   Wakefield, J. Facebook encryption threatens public safety, say ministers. BBC, 2019. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-49919464  
[accessed 30 July 2020]
A private space may be necessary to 
develop one’s own plans, to forge 
relationships, to understand the world: a 
public space is necessary to put that plan 
into action, to build on and extend those 
relationships, and to interact with the 
wider world, not merely observe it. 
vision for the future of the platform, has explicitly 
referenced how it is seeking to move away from 
being a digital ‘town square’ to a digital ‘living 
room’. However, what this means beyond metaphor 
is still being established, and without clarity on what 
a private space online is or should be, there is a risk 
of a fragmented implementation of different visions 
of privacy, and the use of different standards and 
different definitions. This will come at a significant 
cost to internet users, businesses and security.
Drawing a distinction between a public and a 
private space is not easy. The very coherence of 
the distinction is fiercely debated. The variance 
across different contexts of conceptions of privacy 
means that finding a definition that is usable by 
transnational platforms and international institutions 
is a challenge. But with these international 
corporations without democratic accountability on 
the way to entrenching the standards for our online 
private and public lives, there is a need to set out 
the standards that a liberal democracy should 
expect of platforms, which centre the needs of  
their citizens.
The traditional ‘public/private’ distinction contrasts 
work or political life with home or family life. On this 
account, what occurs within the home, within the 
bounds of one’s private property, regarding one’s 
closest and intimate relationships, should be private 
to oneself and not exposed to public scrutiny. In 
contrast, if you are in the public arena, you are 
participating in public life, and your actions may be 
observed and critiqued by others.5 It is likely this 
definition which underpins the majority of debates 
on the subject. 
This distinction has been widely criticised as erasing 
the public aspects of private life. Those parts of our 
lives which previously might have been separated 
by spatial distance (work and home, or family and 
wider social life) are now more interconnected 
through the use of online spaces (we can 
communicate with our closest friends privately  
while standing in the middle of the street; we can 
speak to hundreds of people from our living room). 
As such, this designation of different spaces as 
‘public’ and ‘private’ captures the realities of life 
less and less.6  
Some have argued against the distinction 
altogether - that putting ‘private’, family life beyond 
state intrusion or ‘public’ concern, has meant that 
domestic abuse, marital rape, and other forms 
of abuse or sexual and gender-based violence 
have historically been overlooked as ‘private 
matters’, and so delineating such a distinction 
victimises particularly women and girls.7 However, 
an elimination of the ‘private’ altogether, and an 
invitation of state intrusion into private spaces 
on the grounds of ending abuse, is itself likely to 
perpetuate oppressive conditions against members 
of marginalised groups, and overlook how private 
spaces hold real value for many people, even if they 
are hard to precisely define.8 Jennifer Nash writes 
of the value of private spaces for black women and 
communities of colour in particular:9
‘While the private can function as a space 
of violence, abuse, subordination, and 
exploitation, it can also operate as a locus 
of empowerment, safety, community-
building, and solidarity, and it can perform 
contradictory meanings simultaneously.’ 10
What is considered private, or what people desire 
to be private, also varies according to the political 
and social context and other norms with which it 
interacts. In the UK there are frequent concerns 
raised about surveillance carried out by major 
social platforms being the antithesis to privacy. 
Our polling shows that people in the UK often do 
not consider messages sent on Facebook to be 
especially private: a majority think that messages 
sent on Facebook Messenger to a group (54%) or 
a message posted on a Facebook timeline (62%) 
are not private (though 53% think that one-to-
one messages sent on Facebook Messenger are 
private).
However, this view of Facebook as not especially 
private prevails in a context where people appear 
to trust tech companies with their data less than 
their government. 73% of people in our poll said 
they would be upset at tech companies accessing 
the contents of their communications without 
explicit permission, as opposed to only 62% if 
government departments did so. Our respondents 
9
5. DeCew, J. Privacy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, 2018. Available at  https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/privacy/>  
[accessed 30 July 2020]
6. Ford, S.M. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY. Information, Communication & Society 
14:4, 2011. Available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369118X.2011.562220 [accessed 30 July 2020]
7. MacKinnon, C. in DeCew, J. Privacy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, 2018. Available at  https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/
privacy/> [accessed 30 July 2020] and in Schneider, E.M. The Violence of Privacy. 23 Conn. L. Rev. 973, 1990-1991. Available at 
 https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=http://scholar.google.co.uk/&httpsredir=1&article=1363&context=faculty [accessed 30 July 2020]
 8.  Allen, A.  in DeCew, J. Privacy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, 2018. Available at  https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/privacy/> 
[accessed 30 July 2020]
 9.  Nash, J.C. From Lavender to Purple: Privacy, Black Women, and Feminist Legal Theory. 11 Cardozo Women’s L.J. 303, 2004-2005. Available at https://heinonline.
org/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/cardw11&section=18 [accessed 30 July 2020]
 10. Nash, J.C. From Lavender to Purple: Privacy, Black Women, and Feminist Legal Theory. 11 Cardozo Women’s L.J. 303, 2004-2005, p.306. Available at https://
heinonline.org/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/cardw11&section=18 [accessed 30 July 2020]
11. Privacy Camp. “Actually, In Google We Trust”? A ‘Deconstructing’ Conversation on Russian Internet Activism. 2020. Available at https://privacycamp.eu/?page_
id=1949 [accessed 03 August 2020]
12. Pfeifle, S. China’s evolving views on privacy. IAPP, 2017. Available at  https://iapp.org/news/a/chinas-evolving-views-on-privacy/ [accessed 03 August 2020
13. Pfeifle, S. China’s evolving views on privacy. IAPP, 2017. Available at  https://iapp.org/news/a/chinas-evolving-views-on-privacy/ [accessed 03 August 2020]
14.  Yao-Huai, L. Privacy and data privacy issues in contemporary China. Ethics and Information Technology 7, 2005, pp.7–15. Available at https://cdn.tc-library.org/Rhizr/
Files/4367e301-0301-4e6f-b2d7-f6a54e794a83/042ef109-e363-4179-a284-4e5be354b67f.pdf [accessed 03 August 2020]
15.   Farrall, K.N. Global Privacy in Flux: Illuminating Privacy across Cultures in China and the U.S. International Journal of Communication 2 , 2008, 993-1030. Available 
at  https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/370/228 [accessed 30 July 2020]. See also Lindsey, N. China’s New Encryption Law Highlights Cryptography as 
a Strategic Priority. CPO Magazine, 2019. Available at https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-protection/chinas-new-encryption-law-highlights-cryptography-as-a-
strategic-priority/ [accessed 03 August 2020]; Verma, A. Internet in China: An Emerging Society. IPCS Series on Inside China, 2012. Available at https://www.files.
ethz.ch/isn/143512/SR120-CRP-InternetinChina.pdf [accessed 03 August 2020]; Wang Rong. Data Protection Policies. Tencent Research Institute, 2018. Available at 
https://www.secrss.com/articles/7496 [accessed 03 August 2020]
16.  Yao-Huai, L. Privacy and data privacy issues in contemporary China. Ethics and Information Technology 7, 2005, pp.7–15. Available at https://cdn.tc-library.org/Rhizr/
Files/4367e301-0301-4e6f-b2d7-f6a54e794a83/042ef109-e363-4179-a284-4e5be354b67f.pdf [accessed 03 August 2020] 
17.  Farrall, K.N. Global Privacy in Flux: Illuminating Privacy across Cultures in China and the U.S. International Journal of Communication 2 ,2008, 993-1030.  
Available at  https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/370/228 [accessed 30 July 2020]
18.  Sacks, S. and Laskai, L. China’s Privacy Conundrum. Slate, 2019. Available at https://slate.com/technology/2019/02/china-consumer-data-protection-privacy-
surveillance.html [accessed 03 August 2020]  
19.  Farrall, K.N. Global Privacy in Flux: Illuminating Privacy across Cultures in China and the U.S. International Journal of Communication 2 ,2008, 993-1030. Available at  
https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/370/228 [accessed 30 July 2020]
20.  Mabika, V. The Internet Society and African Union Commission Launch Personal Data Protections Guidelines for Africa. Internet Society, 2018. Available at https://
www.internetsociety.org/blog/2018/05/the-internet-society-and-african-union-commission-launch-personal-data-protections-guidelines-for-africa/ [accessed 03 
August 2020] 
21.  Belli, L. Data protection frameworks emerging in the BRICS countries. IAPP, 2020. Available at https://iapp.org/news/a/data-protection-frameworks-emerging-in-the-
brics-countries/ [accessed 03 August 2020] 
22.  OHCHR. The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age. United Nations, 2020. Available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/digitalage/pages/digitalageindex.aspx 
[accessed 03 August 2020] 
23.  General Data Protection Regulation. Intersoft Consulting. Available at https://gdpr-info.eu/ [accessed 03 August 2020]
24. Farrall, K.N. Global Privacy in Flux: Illuminating Privacy across Cultures in China and the U.S. International Journal of Communication 2 ,2008, 993-1030.  
Available at https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/370/228 [accessed 30 July 2020]
25.  Kupfer, J. Privacy, Autonomy and Self-Concept. American Philosophical Quarterly 24: 1, 1987. Available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/20014176?read-now=1&refre
qid=excelsior%3Af09f486507af243c780703acd873f9f8&seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents [accessed 30 July 2020]
26.  Rachels, J. Why Privacy is Important. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4:4, 1975, pp. 323-333. Available at
 http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/Rachels_on_Privacy.pdf [accessed 30 July 2020]
27. Cohen, J.E. What Privacy Is For. Harvard Law Review 126, 2013. Available at https://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol126_cohen.pdf  
[accessed 30 July 2020]
28. NB: Poll responses have been edited throughout for clarity
were all from the UK - in a different social context, 
where the risks associated with tech companies 
or government accessing communications are 
different, these calculations of which spaces are 
more private may change. Where there is political 
persecution of activists by the state, people may be 
happier to use platforms such as Facebook, than 
more technically secure options. This is because, 
while Facebook will collect more personal data, it is 
viewed as less likely to disclose information to other 
parties, and so may be regarded as ‘private’ from 
the state institutions who matter to these users.11  
Conceptions of the nature and value of privacy itself 
vary across contexts. For instance, in China, privacy 
(‘yinsi’ ‘隱私’) has historically been associated 
primarily with protecting one’s reputation, and 
the need to keep secrets - though over time this 
narrow definition has expanded.12 The purpose 
of privacy is often linked to wider social benefits 
rather than primarily to individual benefits: for 
example, freedom of thought and autonomy for an 
individual is linked by Li and Na to greater feelings 
of safety and so to social stability.13,14 Liang Qichao 
argued that ‘the public welfare gong de (公德) 
was dependent upon a bounded private domain 
si de (私德) where thought could be cultivated.’15  
But although government surveillance of online 
spaces is widespread, privacy protection regulation 
governing what tech companies can do with 
user data is strengthening, alongside critiques of 
excesses in surveillance,16,17 increasing calls for 
better data protection, and the persistence of 
‘reasonable expectations’ of privacy.18,19  
Thus contextual variance may affect how and why 
people think that online spaces should be private  
or not. But the key concern remains, that there is 
value in private spaces, online and offline, within 
which you have control and freedom. The value  
of privacy and data protection specifically online 
has been affirmed by the AU, BRICS, EU, and  
UN.20,21,22,23  What is missing is consensus on: how 
far that value is defeasible; the source of that value; 
how best to protect that value and who from; and 
what constitutes harm that must be protected 
against.
Private spaces have an important role to play 
in facilitating individual autonomy - they are 
essential to our development of our sense of self, 
our relationships, and how we understand and 
connect with the wider world around us.  Being 
able to set the boundaries which determine the 
form and nature of our interactions with others is 
a crucial element of realising personal autonomy 
through using private spaces.24,25 This control helps 
us manage and develop different relationships 
with different people, in which our behaviour may 
vary.26 Privacy also helps us to develop our sense of 
ourselves, separated to some degree from outside 
view and so influence.27 This was echoed by some 
of the respondents to our poll, who when asked 
for their own definition of a ‘private space online’, 
defined private spaces as places of freedom: 
‘Away from trolls and negativity,  
allowed to express yourself openly’ 
Female, 18-24  28 
10
11
29.  Supreme Court of the United States. Packingham vs North Carolina. No. 15-1194, 2017. Available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1194_08l1.
pdf [accessed 30 July 2020]
30. With thanks to participants at our roundtable discussion for clarifying the necessity of this point, July 2020
Private spaces online also have clear instrumental 
value in protecting people from certain harms. They 
allow people to communicate safely - especially 
important for, for instance, journalists or activists in 
countries where they face government persecution, 
or for people discussing things which could lead to 
discrimination or persecution against them, such as 
their religion or sexual orientation. As such, private 
spaces online enable rights to be protected which 
we value in a liberal democracy - a free press, non-
discrimination, safety and security and liberty of the 
person. 
Private must also be defined in contrast to public. 
There are parts of the web that must be public: 
or at least, there is a spectrum, and some parts 
of the web - Twitter’s timeline, for instance - are 
more public than others. Public spaces have always 
served a crucial purpose in the context of a liberal 
democracy, and now public spaces online continue 
this tradition: 
‘These websites can provide perhaps the 
most powerful mechanisms available to 
a private citizen to make his or her voice 
heard. They allow a person with an Internet 
connection to “become a town crier with a 
voice that resonates farther than it could  
from any soapbox.”’  29  
A private space may be necessary to develop one’s 
own plans, to forge relationships, to understand 
the world: a public space is necessary to put that 
plan into action, to build on and extend those 
relationships, and to interact with the wider world, 
not merely observe it.
It is worth noting that access to private spaces 
online is not coextensive with having personal data 
privacy online: personal data privacy is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient, condition for a space online 
being private. An online platform could have ‘gold 
standard’ protections for personal data, but the 
spaces in which you operate on that platform may 
still be ‘public’ in the sense that anyone could 
see what you post. Similarly, if you went offline 
completely, and erased your online presence, your 
privacy in the personal data sense would be very 
well protected - but your access to private spaces 
online would be completely cut off - indeed, several 
respondents to our poll said that they did not 
use social media because they did not constitute 
private spaces. Alternately, a space where the 
contents of your communications is private, but 
all of your personal data and metadata of your 
communications are collected and shared, is less 
private than one where this data is not collected.30  
Hence protecting privacy online, which primarily 
concerns an individual, and protecting private 
spaces online, which concerns spaces where 
communication between individuals can occur, 
require different interventions.
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PART 2  
A DEFINITION OF  
PRIVATE SPACES 
ONLINE
In this section, we present our working definition 
of a private space online. We then discuss how 
each part of the definition is consistent with our 
understanding of offline private spaces, legal 
frameworks around private online spaces, and with 
public attitudes towards private spaces. 
Based on our understanding of how concepts of 
private spaces are used and understood, online and 
offline, socially, conceptually and legally, we offer 
the following maxim: 
An online space should be considered private 
insofar as a user can reasonably expect that they 
control who sees information that they share within 
that space. 
This reasonable expectation should be able to 
be based both on social and technical elements 
of a space, in particular accessibility: how social 
relationships as well as design affect who can 
access a space, and for what purposes.
In approaching the question of how to define 
private spaces online, we consider four offline 
analogies, in which our beliefs about and 
expectations of privacy may be more developed. 
This approach of comparing online and offline is 
prompted by public debate: discussions of online 
spaces are full of references to ‘public squares’, 
‘town halls’ and ‘shopping malls’.31 The persistence 
of these metaphors in popular vernacular, tech 
advertising, and policy debates shows that spatial 
metaphors are shaping how we think about these 
issues - and so we need to interrogate them 
appropriately.32 
We present four metaphors for online space below. 
These spaces all vary in their technical aspects: how 
they are designed, how they are built; how many 
entrances they have; whether the walls are glass or 
brick. They also vary in their social aspects - who 
uses the space, and what for, and the norms which 
govern interpersonal behaviour within that space.33  
Based on these analogies, we can see that privacy 
online has several constituent parts: 
First, privacy as a matter of degrees. Second, 
privacy as attributable to individuals who use a 
space. Third, the role of reasonable expectation in 
determining how spaces are treated, and finally, 
the relation of information control within a space to 
privacy. Each part is discussed in more detail below.
31.  Zuckerberg, M. A Privacy-Focused Vision for Social Networking. Facebook, 2019. Available at https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-privacy-focused-
vision-for-social-networking/10156700570096634/ [accessed 30 July 2020]
32.  Hammett, E. Facebook launches UK privacy campaign. Marketing Week, 2019. Available at https://www.marketingweek.com/facebook-launches-uk-privacy-
campaign/ [accessed 30 July 2020]
33.  Karaçor, E.K. Public vs. Private: The Evaluation of Different Space Types in Terms of Publicness Dimension. European Journal of Sustainable Development 5:  
3, 2016, 51-58. Available at https://ojs.ecsdev.org/index.php/ejsd/article/download/331/328 [accessed 30 July 2020]
Visitors to these places find their 
behaviour is monitored, their information 
collected and controlled, for private  
gain and monetisation by the owners  
of the platform.
13
34.  Planning and Housing Committee. Public life in private hands. London Assembly, 2011. Available at https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_migrate_files_destination/Public%20
space%20June%202011%20Webme.pdf [accessed 30 July 2020]
35.  Hemment, D. and others. Digital Public Space. FutureEverything, 2013. Available at https://discovery.dundee.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/20381952/DPS.pdf [accessed 30 July 2020]
36.  Online, people operate with different social norms than in a physical space - a conversation between two people, posted for all to see on Twitter, is regularly picked up and used, 
commented upon, and so forth - someone’s comment can instantly be broadcast to a whole new audience with the click of a button. This affects what expectations users can have, and 
so reduces the privacy those conversations can be said to have. However, there is still a desire for privacy: for instance, on Twitter there is a common critique that if one person criticises 
someone powerful without mentioning them by name, that others should not then mention that person as that risks fall-out for the original speaker. The original user does not expect their 
conversation to be completely private, but they do expect that a measure of the control they exerted over whose attention is drawn to a conversation or not should be respected.
37.   Carmi, E. Media Distortions: Understanding the Power Behind Spam, Noise, and Other Deviant Media. Digital Formations. Available at  https://doi.org/10.3726/b15334 [accessed 
30 July 2020] 
38.  US Supreme Court. Florida v. Riley. 488 U.S. 445, 1989. Available at  https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/488/445/ [accessed 03 August 2020]
39.  Frankel, M. The promises and pitfalls of reporting within chat apps and other semi-open platforms: A journalist’s guide. Nieman Lab, 2018. Available at
 https://www.niemanlab.org/2018/07/a-journalists-guide-to-the-promises-and-pitfalls-of-reporting-within-open-and-closed-and-semi-open-platforms/ [accessed 30 July 2020]
40. Foster, J.C. Lloyd Corporation, Ltd. v. Tanner (1972). The First Amendment Encyclopedia. Available at https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/582/lloyd-corporation-ltd-v-tanner 
[accessed 03 August 2020]
41.  Shenker, J. Revealed: the insidious creep of pseudo-public space in London. The Guardian, 2017. Available at
 https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/jul/24/revealed-pseudo-public-space-pops-london-investigation-map [accessed 03 August 2020]
42.  Sabbagh, D. Facial recognition technology scrapped at King’s Cross site. The Guardian, 2019. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2019/sep/02/facial-recognition-technology-scrapped-at-kings-cross-development [accessed 03 August 2020]
43.  The Newsroom. How police bug and hack crime barons. The Scotsman, 2009. Available at https://www.scotsman.com/news/how-police-bug-and- 
hack-crime-barons-2444297 [accessed 03 August 2020]
44.  Home Office. Covert Surveillance and Property Interference Revised Code of Practice. 2018. Available at  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/742041/201800802_CSPI_code.pdf [accessed 03 August 2020]
Place Accessibility Permitted  
behaviour
Control of  
information
Online equivalents
Public park Free access - open to 
all to enter the space, 
act within the space, or 
observe the space from 
outside 34  
Law enforcement may 
intervene in illegal 
activity
Some legal activities 
may be banned, or 
others encouraged, by 
park rules and facilities 
(set by democratic 
authority) 
Social norms also govern 
behaviour - you don’t go 
sit next to someone you 
don’t know even though 
you can 35
What people are doing is visible to all - 
no ‘membership’ restrictions
But they can reasonably expect e.g. their 
conversations will not be recorded by 
others
CCTV may be used 
 
Democratic oversight of platforms 
is minimal; social conventions 




• Public Twitter account




The owner can choose 
who to let into the 
garden, when, and has 
the right to ask them to 
leave for any reason
Law enforcement may 
enter but the threshold 
of evidence/process 
needed to enter is high 
(e.g. a warrant) 
Any legal behaviour 
permitted. Social 
norms will affect what is 
considered appropriate 
but the owner of the 
garden is likely to set 
the boundaries of 
acceptable behaviour 
rather than the group 
at large
What is happening may be observed 
outside of the space e.g. overheard 
by neighbours and vice versa, may be 
intruded upon by noise from outside  
the garden 37 
Law enforcement may observe from 
outside without special permissions 38 
A space, observable by outside 
parties (such as platforms), within 
which the terms of engagement 
and admission are primarily 
determined by the owner/
administrator
Closest equivalent: 
• Closed Facebook group 39  
• Email accounts which are 





No visible demarcation 
or barriers to entry 
between outside the 
centre and inside the 
centre
Individual shops may 
control entry to their 
shops though they 
appear free to enter 
at will 
Legal precedents in the 
US have established 
that though free to 
access, the public 
are ‘invited’ for the 
purpose of doing 
business, limiting their 
rights to free action or 
expression 40 
Dictated by the law and 
social norms, but also by 
rules of private owners 
of the centre
Rules can be enforced 
by private security 
(e.g. against loitering, 
gathering, playing 
games) and often 
disproportionately affect 
marginalised groups 
(e.g. homeless people 
being told to move) 41 
First Amendment (free 
speech) rights do not 
generally apply in the US 
as centres are not public 
spaces
Surveillance of people’s movements 
within shopping centres is commonplace 
Shopping centres can employ facial 
detection technologies to gather 
demographic information as well as 
attempt to record people’s moods 
or reactions in response to certain 
advertisements
If you connect to WiFi in a shopping 
centre or make a purchase, you are 
handing personal information over 
about your movements, location, and 
possibly dispositions
There are limits on what kinds of 
surveillance or seen as socially 
acceptable - e.g. facial recognition uses 
can generate outcry 42 
Privately owned space which is 
generally accessible but which 
controls activities and collects 
information according to private 
interests
Closest equivalents:
• Public Facebook page
 
Car Accessible only to 
individuals with the 
key and selected 
companions
Cars may be surveilled 
but only bugged in 
certain circumstances 
with appropriate 
authorisation. 43   
This is regarded as 
‘intrusive’ surveillance in 
the UK. 44
 
Legal activities only 
permitted
Within a car, certain 
design features must be 
configured in order to 
protect occupants and 
others (e.g. seatbelts 
installed).
A car does not exist in a private vacuum 
- generally, they are pockets of privacy 
which exist in and travel through public 
spaces
You can have visibility of what people 
are doing in a car, and in some 
circumstances may be able to hear (if 
they have the windows open) 
However, generally, we would presume 
that conversations within a car are 
between the few occupants of that car, 
and not for other people to engage 
with, overhear or act on
A space within which accessing 
conversations requires a key; 
conversations are held to be 
private, though metadata can be 
collected
Closest equivalent:
• End-to-end encrypted one-
to-one chat (e.g. WhatsApp) 
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PRIVACY AS A MATTER OF DEGREES 
As discussed, drawing a clear line between a private 
and a public space is likely to be difficult and error-
prone, if not impossible. No space is entirely 100% 
public or entirely 100% private - different social and 
technical contexts, expectations of users, ownership 
of and access to the space, all intersect to establish 
the degree to which a space is or is not private. 
The offline spaces discussed demonstrate how 
different features may increase the privacy or 
public nature of a space - that controlled access 
may increase, but does not guarantee privacy, that 
there may be oversight even with an individual’s 
privately owned space, and that behaviour may be 
permitted, facilitated or recorded within different 
spaces to different degrees. An approach which 
recognises that privacy of a space is a spectrum, 
rather than an either/or attribute is more likely to 
be practically applicable to different spaces and 
in different contexts. Moreover, privacy admitting 
of degrees is more likely to be conducive to 
protecting users online than a strict definition.  
Since very few spaces can be called 100% private 
from all other parties, a degrees-based definition 
allows us to require that information shared in 
certain spaces be treated as private even if it could 
technically be accessed or compromised.45 It also 
allows for distinctions to be made where a space 
may be private from some parties and not private 
from others, without designating such a space as 
simply not private due to limited access.46 
‘The element of control over one’s personal 
life is never all-or-nothing, but a matter of an 
infinite number of degrees and decisions.’ 47  
That different spaces may be private in some 
aspects and not private in others was reflected in 
our polling results. For instance, 38% of people said 
an email sent to one person was ‘fairly private’ and 
31% said it was ‘very private’; 36% said a message 
sent to one person on Facebook Messenger was 
‘fairly private’ and 17% said it was ‘very private’. 
Respondents did not view spaces as either ‘very 
private’ or ‘not at all private’, but affirmed that there 

































































Not at all private
In g neral, h w private do you think the c tent  
shared is when someone does th  following?
45,46. Thanks to roundtable participants for these clarifying comments, July 2020
47.  Lord Justice Leveson. AN INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE, PRACTICES AND ETHICS OF THE PRESS: REPORT. The Leveson Inquiry, 2012.  
Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270939/0780_i.pdf [accessed 30 July 2020]
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Definitions suggested in our polling for what makes 
a private space online suggests a spectrum along 
the following lines: 
• Most private - a personal, secure online space, 
which can be accessed and controlled only by 
one individual user. 
• Semi-private - a space where only a limited 
number of known participants communicate, 
where trust and technical safeguards allow 
information shared to be controlled - perhaps 
with exceptions for legitimate authorities to 
access or transparent platform oversight.48  
• Not at all private - a space where contents of 
communications can be viewed by anybody, and 
used or shared without having to go through any 
barriers - though social expectations and safety 
precautions may limit what people share in these 
spaces.
In short, we should not think of spaces as ‘private’ 
or ‘public’ completely. Rather, the existence of a 
spectrum of privacy, and a wider variety of types of 
spaces, need to be recognised in policy debates on 
these spaces. 
PRIVACY AS ATTRIBUTABLE TO  
INDIVIDUALS WHO USE A SPACE
The analogy of the private garden specifically 
shows that one space may hold different levels 
of privacy for different people. The person who 
owns the garden can ensure anyone they do not 
trust, or feel comfortable speaking freely around 
(highlighted in our polling as key elements of a 
private space online) is excluded. However, the 
other guests in a space lack this privilege - they 
have been invited in and must put up with other 
people if the owner (or the admin) does not see 
fit to remove them. This shows that the privacy of 
a space can best be understood on an individual 
level, related to whom an individual has privacy 
from, rather than designating a space in all cases as 
‘private’ or ‘public’.
Privacy is also a human right which is owed at 
the individual level (respecting the privacy of a 
group at the expense of the privacy of some of 
its members would not be consistent with the 
framework). Article 12 of the UN Declaration 
on Human Rights states that: ‘No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks 
upon his honour and reputation.’49 Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights states that 
‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence’.50  
The General Data Protection Regulation also affords 
protection for data privacy on an individual level, 
with personal data defined as information that 
relates to an identified or identifiable individual.51 
Our polling highlighted the importance of privacy 
as relating to an individual. When asked to define 
a private space online, many respondents focused 
on the individuality of a private space - that it was 
specifically a space for them alone to use that was 
‘mine’, particularly to store ‘personal’ information, 
that were your own ‘business’, such as photos, 
videos, documents, and personal one-to-one emails 
to family and friends. The sense of a space being 
‘one’s own’ was important in defining a private 
space online - being alone in a room or being in 
one’s home were metaphors used to describe  
these spaces:
‘Me and me only’  Female, 60+
‘My own world’  Female, 25-39
‘Encrypted and never available to be viewed 
by another human being ever’  Male, 40-59
In short, though an online space may have many 
different members, the privacy of that space as it 
pertains to different individuals should be taken  
into consideration when designating a space as 
private or public.  
THE RELATION OF INFORMATION  
CONTROL WITHIN A SPACE TO PRIVACY
An online space should be considered private 
insofar as a user can reasonably expect that  
they control who sees information that they  
share within that space. 
Control of information is crucial to privacy offline: 
when we think about the ways our privacy can 
be invaded in the spaces discussed, people or 
companies gathering information about our 
presence in the space, our activities or information 
we share with others through conversations.  
We can also be said to share information  
through our actions - about who we are and  
what we are doing.52 
48. Demos. The Online Harms White Paper: A Consultation Response From Demos. 2019 
49. OHCHR. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1948, Article 12. Available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf [accessed 
30 July 2020]
50.  ECHR. European Convention on Human Rights. 2010, Article 8, p.11. Available at  https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [accessed 30 July 
2020]
51.  ICO. What is personal data? Available at https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/key-
definitions/what-is-personal-data/ [accessed 31 July 2020]
52. Thanks to roundtable participants for these clarifying comments, July 2020
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In the shopping centre, which is the closest offline 
analogy to commonly-used social media sites 
such as Facebook, apparent freedom is somewhat 
illusory. Visitors to these places find their behaviour 
is monitored, their information collected and 
controlled, for private gain and monetisation by the 
owners of the platform. This commercial oversight 
means that in such spaces you cannot be entirely in 
control of who has access to information about you 
and what you do in that space.53  
The legal discussion of what accountability 
people should hold for sentiments expressed in 
personal messages often centres around whether 
employers can fire or discipline staff on the basis 
of the contents of such messages. Legal analysis 
of cases in France surrounding employees’ 
use of Facebook suggests that where personal 
messages are visible to the sender and recipient, 
they count as private (and so cannot be the basis 
for employer disciplinary action). However, if the 
visibility of these messages is made broader (e.g. 
by leaving the message on a screen others can 
read) the protections for private messages no 
longer apply.54 Similarly, with posts on a Facebook 
profile, where that profile is public or even where 
it is not fully private (i.e. friends of friends can view 
it), the contents are viewed as public as they are 
widely accessible - the user has ceded control over 
who precisely can access their communications. 
Accordingly, a private profile is often viewed as 
private - though with some contention that the 
purpose of Facebook is the wide sharing of content, 
and it is not technically confidential as it is posted 
on an unsecured space on the Internet.55,56     
Thus ceding control of information in a space  
is frequently seen as reducing the privacy of  
that space. 
Our polling also highlighted that control of 
information and control of who accesses a space 
were crucial in people’s conception of private 
spaces online. A high majority of participants (87%) 
said having control of who can see the information 
they share online is important to them. 
When asked to define a private space online, 
there were several themes which emerged 
from the responses, which highlighted that 
control of information shared within a space was 
central. Control itself was central to many of the 
respondents’ definitions of a private space online. 
The word ‘control’ was frequently used, but other 
words, such as ‘decision’ or ‘choice’, reinforced the 
central role that a user being able to determine for 
themselves what happens in a private space plays. 
Often this control was about who gets to make 
decisions about who has access to spaces, using 
terms like ‘permission’, ‘consent’, ‘authorisation’ 
and ‘invitation’. It was also about control of 
information shared within spaces - including 
information about your identity (anonymity), 
messages or data posted within a space. 
‘One which I could monitor, and had control 
over who was able to access it, and only 
open to the people I chose it to be open to.’
Female, 40-59
Features which made spaces online more 
technically secure, a means by which to control 
information, were frequently cited as defining a 
private space online, as well as general terms used 
like ‘safe’ and ‘secure’. Encryption, including end-
to-end encryption, password protection, use of 
VPNs, security against hacking or leaks, verification, 
use of security questions and PIN numbers, were 
all mentioned by respondents. Social elements 
of a space which made information control more 
likely were also mentioned in definitions: from 
access to a space being limited only to known 
people, to trusting everyone else in the space, to 
communicating primarily with friends and family in 
private spaces. 
Many also thought that private spaces online 
were impossible because of a lack of control 
of information. This lack of control was linked 
to ‘government and intelligence spyware’, the 
possibility of other people in a space sharing 
information more widely, and people determined to 
access information (potentially referring to hackers). 
Those who said it was non-existent often expressed 
negative attitudes towards its non-existence - 
showing a desire for privacy, but a frustration with 
the lack of control that online services currently 
provide to their users, which puts some people off 
engaging online altogether.                
‘No such thing, as once information is online 
it can be made available by anyone who has 
access.’  Male, 60+
53. Carmi, E. Media Distortions: Understanding the Power Behind Spam, Noise, and Other Deviant Media. Digital Formations. Available at  https://doi.org/10.3726/
b15334 [accessed 30 July 2020] 
54.  Guardelli, L. and Fonseca L. Can employees be disciplined for their Facebook comments? International Law Office, 2018. Available at https://www.
internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Employment-Immigration/France/Coblence-Associs/Can-employees-be-disciplined-for-their-Facebook-comments [accessed 
30 July 2020]
55.  Guardelli, L. and Fonseca L. Can employees be disciplined for their Facebook comments? International Law Office, 2018. Available at https://www.
internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Employment-Immigration/France/Coblence-Associs/Can-employees-be-disciplined-for-their-Facebook-comments [accessed 
30 July 2020]
56.  The Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Romania – the Helsinki Committee. Personal Facebook Pages Are Public Space in Romania. Liberties, 2014. 
Available at https://www.liberties.eu/en/news/romania-facebook-profiles-are-public-space/2494 [accessed 30 July 2020]
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As identified in the polling, once any information 
is shared in an online space we cede some 
level of control over who sees it. A friend could 
tell someone else; a family member can take a 
screenshot and post it on Twitter; information could 
be obtained by hackers. Hence we take ‘control’ 
here to be control of the first-order; that is, does 
a user control who immediately has access to the 
information? And does a user not only have the 
potential to control this, but actually do so? For 
instance: a Facebook wall is set to ‘public’. The user 
cannot control, under these settings, whether or 
not I look at their Facebook wall. They can change 
the settings to private, to keep me out; or block me 
specifically - but to do so would be to change the 
privacy of the online space. A public Facebook wall 
is not private just because it could be made private 
- it is private only if control is actually exerted.  
In short, user control of the information they share 
must be central to any definition of a private 
space online. People may vary in how they wish 
that control to be exerted - whether via technical 
security, access restrictions, or social factors such 
as trust - but the need for private spaces online to 
grant users control over their information is clear.
THE ROLE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATION IN 
DETERMINING HOW SPACES ARE TREATED
An online space should be considered private 
insofar as a user can reasonably expect that they 
control who sees information that they share  
within that space. 
How far online spaces are private is affected not 
only by whether users in fact have total control over 
their information (these will be few and far between) 
PRIVACY BY DESIGN – A NOTE ON ENCRYPTION
As well as granting us new places in which to 
speak, online communication grants us new ways 
of speaking. Online, we can safeguard many of our 
most private actions from intrusion by speaking in 
code, using encryption. Put simply, encryption is the 
ability to encode data - a message, for example, or 
a password - in such a way that only the intended 
recipient can decrypt and view it. 
Encryption comes in different forms, which can 
affect who is able to read encrypted messages. Let’s 
suppose that a user’s phone sends a message to the 
phone of a recipient, by sending it through a server 
run by a messaging application.
• ‘Transport-layer’ encryption protects messages 
in transit. In our example, this type of encryption 
protects the message as it was sent from the 
sender’s phone to the messaging server (which 
may be e.g. run by Google), where it is decrypted. 
It is then encrypted again before being sent from 
the server to the recipient’s phone. This protects 
the message from anyone able to intercept it 
in transit, but does not prevent the company 
controlling the server from reading  
the message.57,58    
• End-to-end encryption, by contrast, means 
that the message is encrypted on the sender’s 
device,and decrypted on the recipient’s device.59 
Due to how the message is encrypted, it can only 
be decrypted by the intended recipient, and not 
by the company providing the communications 
service, law enforcement or other third parties. 
The success of either of these methods depends 
upon the strength of the encryption. No encryption 
is perfect, and anyone who is able to intercept a 
message and work out exactly how it was encoded 
will be able to convert it back into the original 
text (or image, video, voice call etc.) The aim of 
encryption is to make the task of finding the ‘key’ 
used to turn the data from a message into code so 
nearly impossible that the data remains secure. 
The ability to seamlessly encrypt messages has a 
powerful effect on the privacy of those messages 
from eavesdroppers. This power flows not from the 
design of the platforms on which a message is sent, 
or from the rules and regulations governing those 
platforms, but from the form of the communications 
themselves. A subject sending a strongly encrypted 
message on the internet doesn’t need to trust 
the cables, routers and other machines which 
will transmit this message to its recipient not to 
intercept it, nor trust assurances given by platforms 
that they will not access message contents, since 
only the recipient themselves can decode and 
understand it. The privacy of the message is built 
into the message itself.
57. EFF. What Should I Know About Encryption? Surveillance Self-Defense, 2018. Available at https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/what-should-i-know-about-encryption 
[accessed 30 July 2020]
58.  Newsbeat. Encryption on Facebook Messenger and other chat apps. BBC, 2018. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/newsbeat-43485511 [accessed 30 July 
2020]
59.  EFF. A Deep Dive on End-to-End Encryption: How Do Public Key Encryption Systems Work?  Surveillance Self-Defense, 2018. Available at https://ssd.eff.org/en/
module/deep-dive-end-end-encryption-how-do-public-key-encryption-systems-work [accessed 30 July 2020]
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but also by whether users have a reasonable 
expectation of control.
In offline spaces, how people’s information is 
treated is governed not only by legal or commercial 
oversight, but also by social norms. This is linked 
to how people expect that they will be treated 
and think that others expect to be treated: nothing 
prevents someone from sitting next to someone 
and listening to their private conversation in a park, 
other than the general social expectation that it 
should not be done.
Reasonable expectation is also a concept often 
cited in legal and regulatory cases around privacy, 
both online and offline.
The Press
When conversations are held in a space where 
other members of the public are present, (e.g. 
in a cafe, a park, a bar), how private information 
communicated in such a setting should be used has 
been held to depend not only upon the expectation 
of the speaker, but the reasonableness of that 
expectation. When Paul Mason claimed he had a 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in a restaurant 
discussing Jeremy Corbyn, a conversation which 
was reported by the Sun, IPSO did not find that 
their code of conduct had been breached and 
rejected his claim due to ‘the complainant’s 
professional role, the nature of his conversation, its 
timing and its location, in the environment of the 
party conference’.60 Jonathan Peters has suggested 
that in these ‘quasi-private’ environments, who has 
control of and access to the space and whether 
those in the space have signalled they expect 
privacy are relevant factors in establishing whether 
a space is private or not. These need not be explicit 
requests for privacy, but could be, for instance, 
behavioural signals, such as a user anonymising 
themselves.61,62  
Employers
In the case of Bărbulescu v. Romania, Mr Bărbulescu 
had been dismissed by his employer after he was 
found to have used a company email account 
to send personal emails, which was established 
by the company accessing these emails.63 The 
European Court of Human Rights found that 
‘Bărbulescu’s right to respect for his private life and 
correspondence under Article 8 was not adequately 
protected by the national authorities’.64 This was 
not on the basis that the employer should not have 
accessed the personal emails at all - but rather 
that legitimate access required certain steps be 
taken, including ensuring employees had accurate 
expectations of the privacy of their work emails, 
such as being notified in advance that the contents 
of their emails might be monitored.65 
Platforms
Platforms’ use has also been criticised on the 
grounds that personal messages should not be 
accessed by platforms where users are led to 
expect they are private. A class action lawsuit 
was brought against Facebook in the USA on the 
grounds that Facebook read and used which URLs 
were shared in private Facebook messages to 
target ads at individuals. (The case was settled on 
condition that Facebook updated its data policy 
and shared information in its Help Centre).66 This 
case implies that whether a space online should 
be counted as private from platforms accessing 
them depends on user expectation and knowledge 
of whether or not a space will be accessed, rather 
than the nature of the communications or the public 
accessibility of the contents. 
Law Enforcement
In the US, legal discussions around when 
communications online should be private from law 
enforcement without a warrant arises from where 
those communications have been given to a third 
party (not the sender or recipient). The ‘third-
party doctrine’ holds that ‘the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit government authorities from 
requesting and obtaining information entrusted 
to a third party’ - such as a phone company to 
whom you have conveyed the phone number 
which you are calling.67 However, Hodge argues 
that a demonstrated expectation of privacy can 
60. IPSO. Decision of the Complaints Committee 13165-16 Mason v thesun.co.uk. 2017. Available at https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-statements/
ruling/?id=13165-16 [accessed 03 August 2020] via Porter, D. Brexit whispers: when eavesdropping on private conversations by a journalist is ethically justified. 
The Conversation, 2019. Available at [accessed 03 August 2020] https://theconversation.com/brexit-whispers-when-eavesdropping-on-private-conversations-by-a-
journalist-is-ethically-justified-111799
61.  Peters, J. Can I do that? A legal primer for journalists. Columbia Journalism Review, 2015. Available at  https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/can_i_do_that_a_
legal_primer_for_journalists.php [accessed 03 August 2020]
62.  IPSO. Decision of the Complaints Committee 13165-16 Mason v thesun.co.uk. 2017. Available at https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-statements/
ruling/?id=13165-16 [accessed 03 August 2020] 
63.  Columbia University. Case of Bărbulescu v. Romania. Columbia Global Freedom of Expression, 2020. Available at https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/
cases/case-barbulescu-v-romania [accessed 03 August 2020] 
64.  ECHR. Q & A: Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Bărbulescu v. Romania. 2017. Available at  https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Press_Q_A_Barbulescu_
ENG.PDF [accessed 03 August 2020] 
65. ECHR. Q & A: Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Bărbulescu v. Romania. 2017. Available at  https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Press_Q_A_Barbulescu_
ENG.PDF [accessed 03 August 2020] 
66.  Bharatkumar, A. Campbell v. Facebook: California District Judge Approves Final Class Action Settlement Over Facebook’s Use of URL Data. Jolt, 2018. Available at 
https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/campbell-v-facebook-california-district-judge-approves-final-class-action-settlement-over-facebooks-use-of-url-data [accessed 03 
August 2020] 
67.  Dixon, H. B. Telephone Technology versus the Fourth Amendment. American Bar Association, 2016. Available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/
publications/judges_journal/2016/spring/telephone_technology_versus_the_fourth_amendment/ [accessed 03 August 2020]
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override the third-party doctrine and come under 
the Fourth Amendment when a user expected the 
third party to keep their information private.68 The 
third party doctrine has been contested in relation 
to online services, in particular, given that users 
may not expect platforms to have access to or 
access their communications - hence emphasising 
that expectation of control is more pertinent to 
determining privacy than actual control.69 
In practice, defining a ‘reasonable’ expectation will 
be contested: reasonable according to whom, by 
whose standards?70 It is true that adherence to this 
concept runs the risk that it is subject to amorphous 
change, as both society and technology develop.71  
However, what it does do at a minimum is confer 
obligations on companies to be transparent and 
upfront about who can see information that users 
share (rather than simply hiding the fact away in 
terms and conditions or  legal jargon) - otherwise 
users may always reasonably expect that their 
information is private.
Does this not risk giving platforms free rein to 
simply make it very clear that users have no 
privacy on their services, and so claim no-one can 
reasonably expect - and thus cannot demand - 
privacy?72 We think not: ‘reasonable expectation’ 
should not be defined purely in relation to (though 
should certainly take into account) how transparent 
a platform’s terms of use are about how they 
control access to, collect and use information 
shared in their spaces. This is an important piece 
of how expectations will be formed, but is not the 
only element. As discussed previously, the features 
of a space itself - its members, its ‘walls’, its rules, 
and how users understand the inner workings of 
platforms, not only their terms of service - all affect 
expectations.73 


































































































For each of the following features of an online space, 
would it make you think it was more or less private, 
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69.  Warfel, E.A. Perceptions of privacy on Facebook. Rochester Institute of Technology, 2008.  
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72. Thanks to C. Véliz for this challenge
73.  Thanks to roundtable participants for clarifying comments and challenges on this point. July, 2020
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We envision a framework in which ‘reasonable 
expectation’, where unclear, would be subject to 
judicial scrutiny. The legal system frequently deals 
with concepts which are not fully defined, but is 
able to apply them based on the legal and social 
context within which they are relevant. Thus this 
element also allows for some contextual variance 
in definitions of privacy, where appropriate, as 
expectations and legal frameworks can vary 
accordingly.74  
Our polling indicated that the following features 
may be most relevant to determining people’s 
expectation: 
74.   Farrall, K.N. Global Privacy in Flux: Illuminating Privacy across Cultures in China and the U.S. International Journal of Communication 2 ,2008, 993-1030.  
Available at  https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/370/228 [accessed 30 July 2020]
• Whether a space is encrypted (53% say it makes a 
space more private)
• If what is shared within that space is visible to 
others outside of the space (44% say it makes a 
space less private)
• If the space can be searched for and found by 
anyone (40% say it makes a space less private)
• Whether access is controlled by existing members 
(38% say it makes a space more private)
• If the space is small (38% say it makes a space 
more private)
• Whether members of a space know each other 
(37% say it makes a space more private)
In short, it is not that the only spaces which we 
should think of as private are those in which a user 
in fact has total control of their information. Rather, 
if a user reasonably expects to have that control, 
then the information within that space should be 
treated as private: that information should not be 
accessed or used without their knowledge, except 
in exceptional circumstances.
No space is entirely 100% public or 
entirely 100% private - different social 
and technical contexts, expectations of 
users, ownership of and access to the 
space, all intersect to establish  
the degree to which a space is or  
is not private. 
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PART 3 POLICY  
AND PRACTICE
In this section, we set out some of the ramifications 
of our proposed definition for policy and practice. 
We examine how users can conceive of spaces and 
how platforms should design spaces, as well as how 
policymakers should regulate them and how law 
enforcement should approach them.
In our paper, What’s in a name?, we presented a 
three-part test which approaches to anonymity must 
fulfil: namely that solutions for identity verification 
must:
1. Protect internet users’ ability to choose 
anonymity online, and emphasise its importance 
in preserving freedom of expression.
2. Allow accountable institutions tasked with 
preserving security to exercise their powers 
effectively.
3. Ensure users are able to fully consent to their 
identities being known by other third-parties.75 
We propose that a similar tripartite test can be used 
for examining the problem of private spaces online, 
based on the definition we have offered. We offer 
three answers to the question of who may access 
people’s information that they share in spaces 
online, which apply in different circumstances. 
We discuss these in more detail below:
THE NEED FOR PROTECTED SPACES
There is a need for users to be able to exert 
maximal control over their information if they 
choose. Users should have access to spaces 
which offer clear privacy - where they are able 
to understand and control who has access to 
information which they are sharing, and where data 
is end-to-end encrypted. This need not be the case 
for all messaging services, but where it is not the 
case, this should be clearly communicated to users 
and alternatives offered.
Can I access the contents of  
another person’s communications?
Semi-private spaces Public spacesPrivate spaces
YES, WITH A WARRANT YES, WITH CONSENTNO
In other spaces, users may 
lack technical control, but have 
a reasonable expectation that 
they control the information 
they share there, which should 
only be breached in exceptional 
circumstances
In spaces where users have 
reasonable expectations that 
others may access and use their 
information, platforms and other 
actors may do so. This access and 
use must be fully transparent and 
consented to meaningfully.
There is a need for users to  
be able to exert maximal control 
over their information if  
they choose.
75.  Smith, J. and others. What’s in a name? A forward view of anonymity. Demos, 2020. Available at https://demos.co.uk/project/whats-in-a-name/ [accessed 30 July 2020]
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There is a clear desire and need for spaces which 
are designed to maximise user control of their 
information within them. Our polling found that 
62% said having control of their information was 
very important to them, in contrast to 54% who 
said authorities’ ability to police online spaces 
was very important and 24% who found building 
connections online very important. This indicates 
that private spaces may be the most valued, 
followed by semi-private spaces, followed by public 
spaces (according to the schema set out above). 
Our poll found that 38% of people would like 
content posted both on social media and in private 
communications to be end-to-end encrypted, and 
that 66% said that whether a space was encrypted 
or not was important to them in choosing whether 
they used a space. However, these preferences 
were not contextualised with the risk of harms 
within end-to-end encrypted spaces, and so 
respondents may not have had this in mind. 
Increasing personal control over information is 
not without safety implications. Many platforms, 
including WhatsApp, Facebook Secret Messenger, 
and Telegram, already offer end-to-end encryption, 
and there are plans to expand its use more widely 
- notably on Facebook Messenger.76 Governments, 
including the UK, have called on Facebook not 
to go ahead with these plans without ensuring 
that “a means for lawful access to the content of 
communications” is preserved in order for CSEA 
and terrorism to be prevented, identified and 
prosecuted.77,78 Civil society groups have also 
expressed serious concern about the expansion 
of end-to-end encryption due to the restrictions it 
would place on law enforcement tackling online 
CSEA.79,80 By making end-to-end encryption 
the default, it has been estimated that ‘70% of 
Facebook’s reporting – 12 million reports globally – 
would be lost [if Facebook implements encryption 
as planned].”81  
Proposals to allow law enforcement to access even 
end-to-end encrypted messages have been put 
forward: if it were possible to achieve access in 
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news/uk-claims-facebook-encryption-plan-poses-grave-risk-to-public-safety-1798198/ [accessed 03 August 2020]
79.  DCMS Sub-Committee on Online Harms and Disinformation. Oral evidence: Online Harms and Disinformation. House of Commons, 2020.  
Available at https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/459/pdf/ [accessed 03 August 2020]
80.  NSPCC. Letter to Mark Zuckerberg. 2020. Available at https://www.nspcc.org.uk/globalassets/documents/policy/letter-to-mark-zuckerberg-f 
ebruary-2020.pdf  [accessed 14 September 2020]  
81.  NCMEC, in US/UK/Aus Gov letter:  Wong, J.C. US, UK and Australia urge Facebook to create backdoor access to encrypted messages. The Guardian, 2019.  
Available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/oct/03/facebook-surveillance-us-uk-australia-backdoor-encryption [accessed 03 August 2020]
legal authorisation, without unduly putting users 
at risk, this kind of access could mean a way of 
tackling serious harms without disproportionately 
affecting privacy.82 One such proposal has been 
made by Ian Levy and Crispin Robinson for 
allowing exceptional access: ‘It’s relatively easy for 
a service provider to silently add a law enforcement 
participant to a group chat or call…You end up 
with everything still being end-to-end encrypted, 
but there’s an extra ‘end’ on this particular 
communication.’83 This proposal also argues that 
without such access, reliance on vulnerability 
exploitation by law enforcement risks vulnerabilities 
not being disclosed and fixed, to the detriment of 
general security.84     
Allowing even for lawful access to encrypted 
information, however, poses a serious risk to 
the security of that information. An Open Letter 
responding to this proposal from a coalition 
of civil society, experts and tech companies, 
wrote that: ‘if implemented, it will undermine 
the authentication process...introduce potential 
unintentional vulnerabilities, and increase risks 
that communications systems could be abused or 
misused.’85 The letter described how access of this 
kind would pose particular risks to groups such as 
victims of gender-based violence and people at risk 
of violence from repressive states, and highlights 
that such a move could significantly undermine 
security through intentional or unintentional system 
changes. Vulnerability hoarding would also not be 
fully preventable.86 
As David Kaye, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
freedom of expression writes in his report on 
encryption online: ‘intentionally compromising 
encryption, even for arguably legitimate purposes, 
weakens everyone’s security online.’87 He concludes 
that ‘States should not restrict encryption and 
anonymity, which facilitate and often enable the 
rights to freedom of opinion and expression…
States should avoid all measures that weaken 
the security that individuals may enjoy online, 
such as backdoors, weak encryption standards 
and key escrows.’88 These sentiments, namely 
that law enforcement may pursue legitimate 
aims through other methods, while preserving 
the security for people’s private communications 
that is essential for user protection, have been 
echoed by Human Rights Watch (HRW).89 Similarly, 
over 110 human rights groups globally, including 
HRW, the ACLU and Privacy International have 
called for the protection of the integrity of end-
to-end encryption.90 Privacy should not be seen 
as antithetical to protection, but as part and 
parcel of protecting people online.91 Widespread 
encryption use also provides cover to those using 
the technology to avoid detection, and whose use 
of niche encrypted apps, or enabling of encryption 
of particular conversations, may otherwise arouse 
suspicion.92  
Encryption protects people from harm; it also 
enables those conducting harm to evade detection. 
How do we approach resolving this tension?
We can seek to mitigate the harms which could 
arise from communication through the design 
of the space and the activities within the space - 
rather than seeking control over the contents of 
communications themselves. ‘Privacy by design’ 
and ‘safety by design’ mean that when online 
spaces are being designed, this should happen 
in consultation with experts to ensure that the 
technical infrastructure and user interfaces are 
optimised to promote privacy and safety. For 
instance, tech platforms and law enforcement 
already use a number of techniques to identify 
criminal behaviour on end-to-end encrypted 
platforms, including the identification of suspicious 
behaviour such as the creation of mass accounts,93 
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examining metadata,94 user reporting95 and 
verifying the identity of those using the platform.96  
These kinds of techniques should be invested in, 
and transparently developed in consultation with 
and subject to review by child protection experts. 
However, as these techniques operate at one level 
removed from the content of a message, methods 
have also been suggested for applying detection 
mechanisms for harmful data to encrypted 
messages, without weakening or breaking their 
encryption, or otherwise significantly compromising 
the privacy of the message. 
Consider PhotoDNA, a technology currently 
used by Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Twitter 
and others to detect CSEA material uploaded to 
their platforms.97 To work out whether an image 
is a known piece of CSEA material, PhotoDNA 
calculates a unique fingerprint for it, and compares 
this to the fingerprints of a large database of 
known abuse material, which is maintained by an 
American organisation, the National Centre for 
Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC).98 The 
system is designed to allow matches to be made 
even where an image has been resized, rotated or 
otherwise superficially altered. If a match is found, 
that message is flagged for review and appropriate 
action can be taken. Encryption poses a challenge 
to PhotoDNA as it is currently implemented, as it 
assumes that the server calculating the fingerprint 
for an image has access to the original image. If an 
image or video has been encrypted, the algorithm 
can’t calculate its fingerprint. 
There are potentially a couple of ways in which 
this detection could work without compromising 
privacy. The first is to detect CSEA material earlier, 
before it is encrypted. This would involve running 
the PhotoDNA algorithm on the device used to 
send the message, scanning any images present, 
and comparing their hashes to the database of 
known abuse material. Agencies checking the 
image against NCMEC’s database would not see 
the image itself, but only the fingerprint - a string  
of letters and numbers. 
This approach of ‘on-device hashing’ would 
preserve privacy - control of the information in a 
message is not ceded to a third party - but raises 
some serious questions around how it would 
be implemented. The exact process by which 
PhotoDNA works is presently not public knowledge 
- potentially with the reasoning that distributing a 
copy of the algorithm would allow people to test 
for loopholes, and find ways to evade detection. As 
cryptographer Matthew Green points out:
“While it might be possible to cram 
[detection algorithms] onto a user’s phone, 
it’s hugely more difficult to do so on a billion 
different phones, while also ensuring that 
nobody obtains a copy of it.” 99 
A second, more secure approach involves the 
use of ‘secure, multi-party computation’ (MPC) 
techniques, such as homomorphic encryption, 
which allow computation such as PhotoDNA to be 
carried out on encrypted data, without needing 
to parse the original image. This technique was 
described by a participant at our roundtable as 
being like: having a good idea what present you are 
getting for Christmas, looking at the parcels under 
the tree, and working out which present it is by size, 
shape and sound without having to unwrap and see 
what is inside any of the presents.100 However, while 
there are promising advances being made in this 
area, cutting edge approaches are currently both 
untested at scale, require huge amounts of data 
transfer to work, and may not be compatible with  
as strong encryption of users’ information.101 
Given that employing these methods would mean 
that some information about the contents of a 
message would be shared with third parties, those 
messages would not technically be completely 
private, under our definition. However, they would 
be much closer to private than the standard ‘semi-
private’ space we have defined, as the information 
users cede control of is limited to whether the 
contents of a message contain illegal content or 
not, rather than the contents themselves. 
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There is thus an urgent need to test and find 
solutions which allow CSEA and terrorist activity to 
be detected, while preserving the protection of, 
privacy offered by and availability of end-to-end 
encryption.102  
LEGAL ACCESS TO PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS
In other spaces (e.g. private messages) users may 
have a reasonable expectation that they control 
the information they share there, which should only 
be breached in exceptional circumstances. 
In general, information which is not accessible 
to law enforcement without using intrusive 
measures requires legal permission to be accessed. 
Currently, there are three main kinds of ‘private’ 
information that social media platforms such 
as Facebook and Twitter can hand over to law 
enforcement - the contents of communications, 
metadata of such communications, and personal, 
non-public information about the user who sent 
the communication. Both Facebook and Twitter 
will generally only hand over such information 
in response to a valid legal compulsion (such as 
a court order, subpoena or warrant, depending 
on the situation), except in particular emergency 
cases where immediate risk warrants disclosure of 
information.103,104 
Public attitudes are notably different for law 
enforcement access to online spaces compared to 
platform access. 50% think law enforcement should 
be able to access anonymised data about personal 
messages for the purposes of crime prevention. 
39% would accept intelligence services accessing 
people’s personal messages if it meant people 
would be kept safer - a minority, but the highest 
proportion of public acceptance across different 
groups who could have such access.
84% said that authorities being able to police 
online abuse and the use of online spaces in 
criminal activities was important to them. When 
asked if law enforcement should have access 
to personal messages sent between individuals 
online if it was not anonymised, but there is reason 
to believe it is connected to a crime, 43% said 
they should, 29% said not, and 28% didn’t know. 
However, 67% said that they would be upset if 
intelligence services accessed the (non-anonymised) 
contents of their communications without them 
giving explicit permission.
This shows that there is support for tackling harms 
in private spaces, but more so when that support 
is targeted at specific people who are suspected 
of criminal activity, and less so when that would 
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Should
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Do you think law enforcement should or should n t be able to 
access personal messages between individuals sent online if:
Privacy has been taken to mean, in the US 
context particularly, ‘presumptive immunity from 
regulation’.105 Generally, the condition for accessing 
private spaces or private correspondence such 
as letters, is a legally obtained warrant - notably 
under the Fourth Amendment, in the US, which 
establishes ‘the right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures’.106 
In Riley vs California, one of a number of cases 
where a suspect’s phone had been examined 
without warrant, which supplied information used 
as evidence against them, the US Supreme Court 
ruled that ‘our holding, of course, is not that the 
information on a cell phone is immune from search; 
it is instead that a warrant is generally required 
before such a search, even when a cell phone is 
seized incident to arrest.’107,108  
Thus, as with a private dwelling, it seems that no 
space is likely to be 100% private - that is, in your 
complete control, since given certain circumstances, 
that control is ceded to the authorities. Under RIPA, 
it has been ruled that even the act of handing over 
an encryption key, including those held in computer 
memory, does not violate the privilege of self-
incrimination, and so someone can be compelled 
under criminal penalty to do so.109  
However, not all legal regimes are as robust 
in terms of protecting privacy in such cases 
as in these US examples, according to Privacy 
International, and changes to which legal standards 
law enforcement must adhere in collecting data, 
even from US-based platforms, have meant 
that the more stricter principles do not apply 
globally.110 The conditions under which warrants 
may be granted in the UK have been criticised for 
being too broad, and thus even the protection of 
warrants can be seen as insufficient to protect the 
privacy of information shared in certain spaces.111  
Privacy International have argued that the use of 
thematic warrants, rather than warrants targeted 
to individuals, is contrary to English common law 
and the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
protection of the right to privacy (though the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal held that the use 
of thematic warrants was lawful.)112,113 Schneier 
also argues that it is relatively more difficult for 
an unauthorized individual to physically add a 
tap to a phone line than it is to exploit technical 
vulnerabilities of online spaces, meaning that a 
private space online may need higher levels of 
protection than a private space offline.114 
Hence, as well as ensuring that there are spaces 
available which offer users a high level of control, 
any access by law enforcement to spaces which are 
reasonably expected to be private should be on 
a targeted basis with strong legal and democratic 
oversight. This means that users can be protected 
whilst allowing online crime to be tackled. 
USER CONSENT FOR THIRD-PARTY ACCESS  
TO PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS
In spaces where users have reasonable 
expectations that others may access and use their 
information, platforms and other actors may do 
so. This expectation must be managed through 
transparency and access and use should be on the 
basis of meaningful consent. 
In some spaces, users may wish platforms to 
oversee the contents of their communications, 
in order to better moderate content, or target 
personalised content and ads. There was some 
support in our poll for content moderation by 
human (30%) or automated (32%) moderators in 
private messages. This is how a significant number 
of ‘private messaging’ services currently operate, 
including email and one-to-one chat messengers - 
but often without user knowledge or clarity. 
In such spaces, the nature, purpose and 
governance of the oversight should be 
transparently communicated and users should be 
empowered to meaningfully consent to this usage 
of their messages. Platforms should not be able to 
defend practices on the grounds that users agreed 
to them where it is clear that the users would have a 
105. Henkin, L. Privacy and Autonomy. Columbia Law Review 74:8, 1974,  pp. 1410-1433. Available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/1121541?read-
now=1&seq=16#page_scan_tab_contents [accessed 30 July 2020]
106.  Dixon, H. B. Telephone Technology versus the Fourth Amendment. American Bar Association, 2016. Available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/
publications/judges_journal/2016/spring/telephone_technology_versus_the_fourth_amendment/ [accessed 03 August 2020]
107.  Supreme Court of the United States. Riley vs California. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2014. Available athttps://casetext.com/case/riley-v-cal-united-states-1 [accessed 03 
August 2020]
108.  Dixon, H. B. Telephone Technology versus the Fourth Amendment. American Bar Association, 2016. Available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/
publications/judges_journal/2016/spring/telephone_technology_versus_the_fourth_amendment/ [accessed 03 August 2020]
109.  Fae, J. RIPA ruling closes encryption key loophole. The Register, 2008. Available at  https://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/10/14/ripa_self_incrimination_ruling/ 
[accessed 03 August 2020]
110. Privacy International. PI response to confused governments’ confusing declaration of war and victory on encryption. 2019. [accessed 03 August 2020] https://
privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/3245/pi-response-confused-governments-confusing-declaration-war-and-victory
111.  Privacy International. No, the UK Hasn’t Just Signed a Treaty Meaning the End of End-to-End Encryption. 2019. Available at  https://privacyinternational.org/
news-analysis/3242/no-uk-hasnt-just-signed-treaty-meaning-end-end-end-encryption [accessed 03 August 2020]
 112. Privacy International. The Queen on the application of Privacy International v. Investigatory Powers Tribunal (UK General Hacking Warrants). 2019. Available at 
https://privacyinternational.org/legal-action/queen-application-privacy-international-v-investigatory-powers-tribunal-uk-general [accessed 21 August 2020]
113.  Privacy International. FAQ: Privacy International UK Supreme Court Judgment. 2019. Available at https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/2898/faq-privacy-
international-uk-supreme-court-judgment [accessed 21 August 2020]
114.  Schneier, B. Evaluating the GCHQ Exceptional Access Proposal. Lawfare Blog, 2019. Available at https://www.lawfareblog.com/evaluating-gchq-exceptional-
access-proposal [accessed 21 August 2020]
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116. Benjamin, G. Digital Society: Regulating Privacy and Content Online. Solent University, 2020. Available at https://digitalcultu.re/policy/digitalsociety/digitalsocietyreport.
html#appendix [accessed 10 September 2020]
117.  Benjamin, G. Digital Society: Regulating Privacy and Content Online. Solent University, 2020. Available at https://digitalcultu.re/policy/digitalsociety/
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reasonable expectation of privacy. Agreement may 
in these cases have been due to the complexity or 
vagueness of the terms of service or obfuscation of 
how platforms operate regards to the use of user 
information, e.g. for profiling and targeting.115 
Currently, this understanding is not present. 69% 
of people in our poll said they considered sending 
an email to one person to be private - the highest 
proportion of any activities in online spaces we 
asked about. Even for an email, widely regarded 
as private, if not end-to-end encrypted (which 
many are not) the contents can be observed not 
only by the recipients but by the email provider. By 
contrast, 56% think that a one-to-one WhatsApp 
message is private, although WhatsApp messages 
are end-to-end encrypted, which offers a level of 
control which many email services do not. 
In our poll, a large number of respondents said 
that they did not know how to define a private 
space online. A few linked this to their lack of use 
of online spaces or familiarity with technology; 
others varied from ‘not sure’ to ‘really have no idea’. 
This uncertainty indicates that users are not fully 
equipped by the platforms and services they use to 
have confidence in how spaces operate, and how 
their information is used:
I really have no idea, it is all too complicated
Male, 60+
I’m not sure as I don’t use them 
Female, 25-39
Users value the privacy of their information from 
the platforms that run the services they use. There 
are strong feelings that people’s information shared 
in private spaces should not be accessed without 
their explicit permission. Our poll found that 73% 
said that they would be upset if tech companies 
accessed the (non-anonymised) contents of their 
communications without them giving explicit 
permission, with 51% saying they would be ‘very 
upset’ at tech companies doing so. 66% of people 
would not accept tech companies accessing 
private messages if it meant people would be kept 
safer - even though this is what tech companies 
are doing in many different spaces. 36% thought 
that platforms should not be able to access 
even anonymised data, when it is used only for 
commercial purposes. 
Similarly, a YouGov poll for Solent University 
found that 63% of people said they would be 
uncomfortable with their messages or emails 
‘deciding what content (e.g. search results, news 
items, adverts, etc.) [they] see online.116 This may 
be related to people’s low trust in platforms (the 
YouGov poll found 71% of people said they did 
not trust Facebook to protect personal data)117, or 
due to expectations of control of private messages, 
as discussed above. Either way, this highlights the 
worrying lack of transparency around what content 
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For each of the following would you say you would or would not 
accept them being able to access people’s private messages if it 
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...it is anonymised and only 
analysed together with lots of 
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Do you think platforms should or should not be able to access 
personal messages between individuals sent online if:
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Actions by platforms such as Facebook to allow 
users to select which groups of other users can see 
what they share are a necessary first step. However, 
other users are not the only parties who may be 
privy to information - privacy also requires privacy 
from those who run the systems. 
Where information is being or may be accessed 
and used by third parties, the nature and conditions 
of this access, and what control the user can - or 
cannot - exercise over it must be communicated 
upfront and in plain terms to users. It should be 
clear what information is accessible about a post 
to other parties - text contents, images, metadata 
- and why this information is accessible: whether 
information is being accessed for commercial 
purposes or for harm reduction purposes. Devolved 
ownership or decentralisation of online spaces, such 
as that offered by spaces like Mastodon, may offer 
greater privacy of online spaces than the dominant 
platforms can, simply by virtue of their business 
models.118  
There are also ramifications for this need for user 
understanding and consent for others who might 
access information that users share online. The 
results of our poll show that people would be most 
upset if researchers and academics accessed the 
non-anonymised contents of their communications 
without their explicit permission. The importance 
of clarity, consent and trust is often foregrounded 
in ethical guides for journalists operating in closed 
groups and should be incorporated into research 
practices more widely.119,120 
The kind of space that users operate in online 
affects the kind of activity they engage in and the 
kind of information they will share. Not having a 
transparent account of the parameters of the spaces 
they use means that people are unable to make 
fully informed choices, and so may modulate their 
behaviour in accordance with uncertainty about 
who can see their information. In turn, this process 
deprives them of the opportunity to fully participate 
in both private and public spaces in fruitful ways. 
Efforts to increase transparency, however, should 
not be simply assumed to have worked: providing 
people with information to interpret should be 
accompanied by proactive measures to help 
users, especially those who might be less digitally 
included, engage with the substance of what that 
information means for them.121
Debates on privacy online often focus on the need 
to protect end-to-end encryption, and indeed, the 
guarantees that technical security offers to users 
are crucial. However, the fact of accessibility to 
the contents of communications does not mean 
that users have no expectation of privacy, from 
platforms as well as other users, and so should 
not mean that users are not offered any privacy. 
Platforms should thus have a burden of proof to 
demonstrate, where they are accessing people’s 
messages for commercial use, that their users have 
no reasonable expectation that that information is 
private from the company. This would include, but 
not be limited to, clear terms of service. 
118. Pers. comm., 2020
119. Frankel, M. The promises and pitfalls of reporting within chat apps and other semi-open platforms: A journalist’s guide. Nieman Lab, 2018.  
Available at https://www.niemanlab.org/2018/07/a-journalists-guide-to-the-promises-and-pitfalls-of-reporting-within-open-and-closed-and-semi-open-platforms/  
[accessed 30 July 2020]
120. Wardle, C. First Draft’s Essential Guide to Closed Groups, Messaging Apps and Online Ads. First Draft, 2019. Available at https://firstdraftnews.org/ 
latest/closed-groups-messaging-apps-and-online-ads-the-new-battlegrounds-of-disinformation/ [accessed 30 July 2020]
121. Thanks to participant roundtables for this point, July, 2020. 
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It should be clear what information is 
accessible about a post to other parties 
- text contents, images, metadata - 
and why this information is accessible: 
whether information is being accessed 
for commercial purposes or for harm 
reduction purposes. 
PART 4  
RECOMMENDATIONS
THE NEED FOR PROTECTED SPACES
• End-to-end encryption as a tool for ensuring 
privacy should be protected. In our view, current 
proposals for exceptional access do not provide 
adequate technical protection for the rights of 
users against extrajudicial access by state or 
non-state actors. Therefore, alternative social 
and technical solutions to the problems of illegal 
content in end-to-end encrypted spaces should 
be invested in and built through collaboration 
and open discussion between government, tech 
platforms and civil society. 
• The government, and technology firms should 
urgently fund research into improving techniques 
which allow for processing needed to prevent 
harm without requiring decryption. This could 
form part of a duty of care on platforms to 
demonstrate they are taking meaningful action on 
online harms occurring in end-to-end encrypted 
spaces. To limit the danger that powerful 
detection technologies such as PhotoDNA are 
employed to detect other forms of expression, 
those putting them to use must be clear 
about the database to which images are being 
compared. If companies are unwilling to do this, 
redress could be sought through regulation.
• When online spaces are being designed, this 
should happen in consultation with experts to 
ensure that the technical infrastructure and user 
interfaces are optimised to promote privacy and 
safety. 
• Where platforms have access to information and 
the contents of communications, how they fulfil 
a statutory duty of care will be different from 
those cases in which they do not. Platforms and 
regulators should use a graded understanding 
of the degrees of privacy a space has in order to 
inform the kinds of responses to online harms that 
would be appropriate in that space.
LEGAL ACCESS TO PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS
• Platforms should provide data relating to people’s 
personal communications (including content or 
metadata) to law enforcement only in a targeted 
way, in response to an authorised request 
with judicial oversight. Legal frameworks for 
authorising such access must be consistent with 
human rights law.  
USER CONSENT FOR THIRD-PARTY  
ACCESS TO PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS
• Platforms should have a burden of proof to 
demonstrate, where they are accessing people’s 
messages for commercial use, that their users 
do not have a reasonable expectation that that 
information is private from the company. This 
would include, but not be limited to, clear terms 
of service.
• Platforms should ensure that information about 
the control and accessibility of spaces, including 
moderation of content, is available to users of 
their services, who should be empowered to fully 
engage with and meaningfully consent to the 
terms offered.122 
• There should be independent oversight of how 
user control of information in a private space is 
maintained and this should be explained before 
and after a user has entered into an agreement 
with a platform.  
• Where activity as well as content - people’s clicks, 
searches and so forth - is being tracked, this 
should also be transparent.123 
30
122. Farrall, K.N. Global Privacy in Flux: Illuminating Privacy across Cultures in China and the U.S. International Journal of Communication 2 ,2008, 993-1030.  
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• Opt-outs of third party access to data should 
be as simple to execute as changing the privacy 
settings of a post from ‘public’ to ‘friends only’. 
• Companies which met these standards, as judged 
by an independent body, could be eligible for 
a ‘kitemark’ that indicated their appropriate 
management of private spaces online.
• Researchers, when seeking to access data from 
platforms should be transparent about their 
activities and intentions, and give users the 
option, where possible, to retain or consent to 
hand over control of their information.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
• There is a need for a framework of standards 
on protecting private and public spaces online 
and combating harms within them to which 
platforms are held to be defined internationally, 
by international institutions, in collaboration with 
civil society.124 This collaboration could be  
funded by an additional digital services tax on 
platforms gathered by national governments,  
and contributed to an international institution, 
such as the UN. 
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APPENDIX  
POLLING RESULTS
Base: Nationally representative sample of 1,035 UK adults interviewed 
online 5 May 2020 - 8 May 2020. Data are weighted to the profile of 
the population. 
Q1. HOW FREQUENTLY, IF AT ALL, DO YOU DO THE FOLLOWING?
All the time Often Sometimes Rarely Never
% % % % %
Message one person on  WhatsApp 32 25 13 5 25
Send an email to one person 29 33 27 9 3
Message one person on  
Facebook Messenger
20 24 20 8 28
Post a message on your  
Facebook timeline
11 18 23 16 32
Message a group on Facebook 
Messenger (e.g. of 10 people)
10 17 16 13 45
Direct message one person  
on Instagram
10 13 13 9 56
Message large groups on Whatsapp 
(e.g. more than 100 members)
9 13 13 8 58
Post on a public Instagram account 8 10 15 9 58
Post on a private Instagram account 8 12 15 8 57
Hold a group call on Google Hangouts 4 9 12 8 67
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Q2. IN GENERAL, HOW PRIVATE DO YOU THINK THE CONTENT  
SHARED IS WHEN SOMEONE DOES THE FOLLOWING?














% % % % % % %
Sends an email to one person 31 38 14 7 9 69 21
Messages one person on  WhatsApp 24 32 16 11 17 56 27
Messages one person on  
Facebook Messenger
17 36 19 14 14 53 33
Direct messages one person  
on Instagram
14 29 18 15 24 53 33
Posts on a private Instagram account 10 30 21 16 23 40 37
Messages a group on Facebook 
Messenger (e.g. of 10 people)
6 24 29 25 15 31 54
Posts a message on their  
Facebook timeline
9 16 29 33 12 25 62
Messages large groups on Whatsapp 
(e.g. more than 100 members)
6 16 25 35 18 22 60
Holds a group call on Google Hangouts 5 17 24 26 28 22 50
Posts on a public Instagram account 4 11 19 45 21 15 64
Q3. FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING FEATURES OF AN ONLINE SPACE, WOULD IT MAKE  






















% % % % % % % %
The content of posts/messages  
is end-to-end encrypted
24 29 22 5 2 18 53 7
New members of a space have to  
be added by an existing member
10 28 31 9 6 16 38 15
The space is small  
(e.g. 10 or fewer members)
10 28 33 9 3 16 38 12
I know everyone else in the space 13 24 34 7 6 16 37 13
Content is moderated by the platform 
using human moderators
9 22 32 11 8 18 32 19
Content is moderated by the platform 
using automated software
7 22 33 10 7 21 29 17
Everyone in the space uses  
their real name
9 16 33 11 15 16 25 26
The space can be searched for  
and found by anyone using a 
conventional search engine
7 11 26 10 30 16 18 40
The content of posts/messages  
can be seen by anyone outside  
of the space without joining
7 11 23 9 35 15 18 44
By 'online space' we mean things like social media (e.g. Facebook), forums (e.g. Reddit) or private messaging platforms (e.g. WhatsApp).
33
Q4. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING FEATURES ARE CLOSEST TO HOW  
YOU PERSONALLY WOULD PREFER ONLINE SPACES YOU USE TO BE?
I would like this 
feature for both 
social media and 
private messaging
I would like this 
feature for social 
media, but not  
private messaging
I would like this 
feature for private 
messaging, but not 
social media
I would not like this 





% % % % %
I know everyone else in the space 38 15 17 7 24
The content of posts/messages is end-
to-end encrypted (so only the sender 
and the recipient can read them)
38 14 16 8 24
Everyone in the space uses  
their real name
35 17 16 8 23
New members of a space have to  
be added by an existing member
29 20 15 11 25
The space is small  
(e.g. 10 or fewer members)
25 18 18 8 31
Content is moderated by the platform 
using automated software
19 23 13 14 21
Content is moderated by the platform 
using human moderators
18 25 12 17 29
The space can be searched for  
and found by anyone using a 
conventional search engine
13 19 11 33 24
The content of posts/messages  
can be seen by anyone outside  
of the space without joining
13 15 11 39 22
By social media, we mean for example posting on Facebook or Instagram. By private messaging platforms, we mean for example Facebook Messenger or WhatsApp.
Q5. HOW IMPORTANT, IF AT ALL, ARE THE FOLLOWING IN  





Not very  
important









% % % % % % %
Whether or not the content of posts/
messages can be seen by anyone 
outside of the space without joining
40 29 11 5 16 69 16
Whether or not you know  
everyone else in the space
34 33 14 5 14 67 19
How, if at all, the content of posts/
messages is monitored
32 34 13 4 16 67 17
The restrictions on how new  
members can be added 
34 34 13 4 15 67 17
Whether or not the content of  
posts/message is encrypted
36 30 13 4 17 66 17
Whether or not everyone in the  
space uses their real name
29 36 16 6 14 64 22
Whether or not the space can be 
searched for and found by anyone  
using a conventional search engine
31 28 17 6 18 59 23
How many people are in the space 22 32 23 7 15 55 30
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Q6. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR VIEWS?
%
People should not be allowed to post content that most people would view as harmful in either public or private online spaces 62
People should be allowed to post content that most people would view as harmful in private online spaces,  
but not public online spaces
16
People should be allowed to post content that most people would view as harmful in public online spaces,  
but not private online spaces
12
People should be allowed to post content that most people would view as harmful in both public and private online spaces 10
Q7. DO YOU THINK LAW ENFORCEMENT SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE ABLE  
TO ACCESS PERSONAL MESSAGES BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS SENT ONLINE IF:





...it is anonymised (all personally identifying information is removed) and only analysed together 
with lots of other data points in order to understand and predict criminal behaviour
50 23 27
...it is not anonymised (it is possible to identify the individual sender or recipient), but there is 
reason to believe it is connected to a crime
43 29 28
Q8. DO YOU THINK PLATFORMS SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE ABLE  
TO ACCESS PERSONAL MESSAGES BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS SENT ONLINE IF:





...it is anonymised and only analysed together with lots of other data points in  
the commercial interests of the platform
35 36 29
...it is not anonymised, but there is reason to believe it is connected to a crime 45 29 26
Q9. DO YOU THINK RESEARCHERS SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE  
ABLE TO ACCESS PERSONAL MESSAGES BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS SENT ONLINE IF:





....it is anonymised and only analysed together with lots of other data points to help understand 
and predict important social phenomena, like how false information spreads
36 36 28
...it is not anonymised, but there is reason to believe it is connected to a crime 44 33 23
35
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Q10. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR VIEWS?
%
Online platforms should always prioritise safety over freedom 40
Online platforms should usually prioritise safety over freedom 19
Online platforms should prioritise safety and freedom equally 35
Online platforms should usually prioritise freedom over safety 3
Online platforms should always prioritise freedom over safety 4





Not very  
important









% % % % % % %
Having control of who can see the 
information you share online
62 25 6 2 6 87 8
Authorities being able to police online 
abuse and the use of online spaces in 
criminal activities
54 30 8 2 7 84 10
Being able to connect with people online, 
including those you do not know offline
24 35 20 12 9 60 31





Not very  
upset








% % % % % % %
Researchers and academics 60 17 10 5 8 77 16
Your employer 54 21 12 5 9 74 17
The media 56 18 12 6 8 74 18
Tech companies 51 22 14 5 8 73 19
Other users 55 18 13 5 8 73 18
Advertisers 51 20 14 6 8 72 21
Independent regulators 49 23 15 5 8 72 20
Your friends 42 28 14 8 7 71 22
Intelligence services 45 22 16 7 10 67 23
Government departments 41 21 18 11 9 62 19
Q13. FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING WOULD YOU SAY YOU WOULD OR WOULD  
NOT ACCEPT THEM BEING ABLE TO ACCESS PEOPLE’S PRIVATE MESSAGES IF IT  
MEANT THAT PEOPLE GENERALLY WOULD BE KEPT SAFER?
Would Would not Don’t 
know
% % %
Intelligence services 39 46 15
Government departments 32 55 13
Independent regulators 25 58 17
Your employer 23 64 13
Researchers and academics 22 63 15
Tech companies 19 66 15
The press 12 75 13
Q13. FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING WOULD YOU SAY YOU WOULD OR WOULD  
NOT ACCEPT THEM BEING ABLE TO ACCESS YOUR PRIVATE MESSAGES ONLINE  
IF IT MEANT THAT YOU PERSONALLY WOULD BE KEPT SAFER?
Would Would not Don’t 
know
% % %
Your employer 24 61 16
Tech companies 23 62 15
The press 13 72 15
Researchers and academics 22 62 16
Independent regulators 28 55 16
Intelligence services 39 45 16
Government departments 32 50 18
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